SIG-005

Proposal ID: SIG-005
Author: Fieldwork Holdings LLC (Treasury)
Status: Proposed
Type: Constitutional Amendment
Created: 2026-02-20
Voting Period: 7 days from posting to Snapshot
Quorum Required (current): 3 of 3 token-weighted members

Abstract

This proposal enacts a comprehensive governance reform for Sigil Consulting DAO-LLC. It reduces the DAO voting quorum from three (3) to two (2), establishes three formal governance bodies — Treasury, Core, and Secretariat — introduces an optimistic consensus settlement mechanism with a Class B fast-track proposal pathway, and restructures the Gnosis Safe multisig to align signer eligibility with governance token holdings. These changes reflect the current token distribution (70/25/5 split favoring Fieldwork Holdings LLC) and create a sustainable operating framework for day-to-day and strategic decision-making.

Motivation

Following the completion of the majority token acquisition by Fieldwork Holdings LLC and the resulting 70/25/5 governance token split, the existing quorum requirement of 3-of-3 creates an operational bottleneck. Any single member can unilaterally block all governance activity through inaction. Additionally, the current Gnosis Safe multisig grants equal signing authority to all members regardless of their governance stake, creating a misalignment between on-chain governance power and treasury execution authority. This proposal replaces that fragile unanimity requirement with a resilient structure that preserves meaningful participation rights for all members while enabling the DAO to function efficiently.

Specification

Article I — DAO Voting Quorum Reduction

§1.1 The voting quorum for all standard proposals (Class A, designated SIG-XXX) is hereby reduced from three (3) to two (2) eligible voting members.

§1.2 A proposal achieves quorum when at least two (2) members holding voting power have cast a vote before the close of the voting period.

§1.3 This quorum threshold applies retroactively to any pending proposals that have not yet settled at the time SIG-005 is ratified.

Article II — Governance Bodies

Three governance bodies are hereby established with distinct powers, constraints, and compositions.

§2.1 — Treasury

Attribute	Value
Composition	Fieldwork Holdings LLC
Voting Power	None (0 weight)
Proposal Submission	Yes — Class A (`SIG-XXX`) and Class B (`SIG-XXX-B`)
Veto Power	No

The Treasury is the administrative and financial steward of the DAO. It may author and submit proposals to Snapshot for consideration but holds no voting power on any proposal class. The Treasury manages the DAO’s on-chain and off-chain assets, executes approved disbursements, and maintains financial records.

§2.2 — Core

Attribute	Value
Composition	`copperlite.eth`, `erajtob.eth`
Voting Power	Yes — 1 vote each (equal weight)
Proposal Submission	Yes — Class A (`SIG-XXX`) only
Veto Power	No

The Core is the deliberative body of the DAO. Core members review, discuss, and vote on all proposals. Each Core member holds equal voting weight regardless of underlying token balance. Core members may author and submit Class A proposals.

§2.3 — Secretariat

Attribute	Value
Composition	Fieldwork Holdings LLC
Voting Power	Yes — 1 vote (equal weight to each Core member)
Proposal Submission	No
Veto Power	Yes — Emergency Intervention (see Article IV)

The Secretariat is the executive oversight body of the DAO. It participates in voting with weight equal to one Core member but may not author or submit proposals. The Secretariat holds exclusive emergency intervention (veto) authority as defined in Article IV.

§2.4 — Role Separation

Fieldwork Holdings LLC occupies both the Treasury and Secretariat seats. These roles are functionally distinct:

When submitting a proposal, Fieldwork Holdings acts in its Treasury capacity and holds no vote on that proposal’s passage.
When voting on a proposal submitted by Core or during optimistic consensus challenge periods, Fieldwork Holdings acts in its Secretariat capacity.
Fieldwork Holdings may not both submit and cast a binding vote on the same proposal. If the Treasury submits a Class A proposal, the Secretariat abstains from the standard vote but retains emergency intervention authority.

Article III — Optimistic Consensus

§3.1 — Default Settlement

All proposals operate under an optimistic consensus model. A proposal posted to Snapshot is presumed to settle in favor unless formally challenged during the voting window.

§3.2 — Challenge Mechanism

A proposal’s optimistic settlement is defeated if any one of the following occurs during the voting period:

Formal Vote Challenge: Any voting-eligible member (Core or Secretariat) casts a vote of Against or Abstain with Objection. Once a challenge vote is cast, the proposal reverts to standard vote-counting rules requiring quorum of 2 and simple majority to pass.
Emergency Intervention: The Secretariat exercises its veto power under Article IV.

§3.3 — Settlement Timeline

Proposal Class	Voting Window	Optimistic Settlement
Class A (`SIG-XXX`)	7 days	End of voting window if unchallenged
Class B (`SIG-XXX-B`)	48 hours	End of voting window if unchallenged

§3.4 — Snapshot Implementation

On Snapshot, optimistic consensus is implemented as a standard single-choice vote with options: For, Against, Abstain with Objection. If zero votes are cast during the voting window, the proposal settles as approved. A vote of For reinforces optimistic settlement. A vote of Against or Abstain with Objection triggers the challenge pathway under §3.2.

Article IV — Emergency Intervention (Veto)

§4.1 — Authority

The Secretariat (Fieldwork Holdings LLC) holds exclusive emergency intervention power. This power may be exercised against any proposal of any class at any point before final settlement.

§4.2 — Invocation

Emergency intervention is invoked by the Secretariat posting a signed on-chain or Snapshot message with the tag [VETO-SIG-XXX] referencing the target proposal ID. The veto takes immediate effect upon posting.

§4.3 — Effect

A vetoed proposal is immediately marked Defeated — Emergency Intervention and cannot settle. The proposal may be resubmitted in amended form as a new proposal with a new ID.

§4.4 — Limitations

Emergency intervention power:

May not be delegated.
May not be used to override a proposal that has already settled.
Must be accompanied by a written justification posted within 72 hours of invocation.
Is subject to review by the Core, who may submit a Class A proposal to formally object to the veto (such an objection is itself subject to veto, preserving the Secretariat’s ultimate authority).

Article V — Class B Proposals (Fast-Track Treasury Actions)

§5.1 — Designation

Proposals submitted by the Treasury for routine operational, financial, or administrative actions may be designated Class B with the identifier format SIG-XXX-B.

§5.2 — Presumption of Safety

Class B proposals carry a presumption of safety and are considered pre-approved for optimistic settlement. They are fast-tracked with a reduced 48-hour voting window.

§5.3 — Scope

Class B proposals are limited to:

Routine treasury disbursements and budget allocations
Contractor and service provider engagements
Administrative amendments to DAO operating procedures
Asset management and rebalancing actions
Operational tooling and infrastructure changes

Class B designation may not be used for:

Constitutional amendments (changes to this governance framework)
Changes to governance body composition or powers
Token issuance, burns, or distribution changes
Mergers, acquisitions, or dissolution actions

§5.4 — Retraction

A Class B proposal may be retracted by:

Emergency Intervention by the Secretariat (immediate effect), or
Community Vote — any Core member may call a challenge vote converting the Class B proposal to a standard Class A vote with 7-day window and quorum of 2.

§5.5 — Treasury Resolution Override

Notwithstanding the scope exclusions in §5.3, the Treasury may designate any proposal as Class B provided that:

Certified Resolution Requirement: The managing body of the Treasury entity (i.e., the Manager of Fieldwork Holdings LLC or its successor) has adopted and certified a formal written resolution explicitly authorizing the Treasury to submit the specific proposal under the Class B pathway.
Resolution Specificity: The certified resolution must identify the proposal by name or subject matter with sufficient particularity to establish that the managing body reviewed and approved the substance of the proposal — not merely a blanket delegation of Class B authority.
Disclosure at Submission: The Treasury must disclose the existence of the certified resolution in the proposal body at the time of Snapshot submission, including the resolution number and date of adoption.
Challenge Rights Preserved: The standard Class B challenge mechanism (§5.4) applies without modification. Core members retain the right to challenge and convert any resolution-authorized Class B proposal to a Class A vote with a 7-day window.

This override recognizes that when the Treasury’s managing body has undertaken formal corporate action to authorize a proposal, the deliberative safeguard provided by the resolution process substitutes for the Class A voting window, while the 48-hour community review period and challenge mechanism preserve the DAO’s oversight role.

§5.6 — Abuse Safeguard

If Core members successfully challenge and defeat three (3) or more Class B proposals within any 90-day period, the Treasury’s Class B submission privilege is automatically suspended for 30 days, during which all Treasury proposals must follow Class A procedures.

Article VI — Gnosis Safe Multisig Restructuring

§6.1 — Quorum Reduction

The execution threshold of the DAO’s Gnosis Safe multisig (the “Safe”) is hereby reduced from three (3) of three (3) signers to two (2) of eligible signers.

§6.2 — Signer Eligibility Threshold

Effective upon ratification of this proposal, signing authority on the Safe is restricted to members holding ten percent (10%) or greater of the total governance token supply ($SIGIL). Members falling below this threshold are reclassified to a proposal-only role.

§6.3 — Eligible Signers

Based on the current 70/25/5 token distribution, the following signer eligibility applies:

Member	$SIGIL Holdings	% of Supply	Safe Role
Fieldwork Holdings LLC	70%	≥ 10%	Signer
`erajtob.eth`	25%	≥ 10%	Signer
`copperlite.eth`	5%	< 10%	Proposal-Only

§6.4 — Proposal-Only Role

Members holding a Proposal-Only role on the Safe:

May submit transaction proposals to the Safe for signer review and approval.
May not confirm, execute, or sign transactions.
Retain full DAO governance rights (voting, Class A proposal submission) as defined in Article II. The Safe role restriction applies solely to treasury execution authority and does not diminish governance participation.
May be restored to Signer status if their token holdings reach or exceed the 10% threshold through acquisition, distribution, or reallocation approved by governance vote.

§6.5 — Safe Configuration

The Safe shall be reconfigured within 48 hours of ratification as follows:

Set execution threshold to 2-of-2 (two signers required).
If the Safe platform does not natively support a “Proposal-Only” role, copperlite.eth shall be removed as a signer and granted access through the Safe’s transaction proposal interface or an equivalent off-chain submission mechanism.
The Secretariat (as Safe administrator) shall publish the updated Safe configuration and signer list within 48 hours.

§6.6 — Dynamic Threshold

The 10% signer eligibility threshold is dynamic and applies continuously. If a future governance action (token migration, redistribution, or new issuance) causes a member’s holdings to cross the threshold in either direction, signer eligibility is automatically adjusted. The Secretariat is responsible for executing the corresponding Safe configuration changes within 7 days of the triggering event.

§6.7 — Rationale

The prior 3-of-3 multisig configuration granted equal treasury execution authority to a 5% stakeholder. This created a disproportionate veto over fund movements and operational transactions. The 10% threshold ensures that signing authority is held by members with meaningful economic alignment, while the Proposal-Only role preserves minority members’ ability to initiate and participate in treasury governance through the proposal mechanism.

Article VII — Voting Power Strategy (Snapshot)

§7.1 — Strategy

Voting power on Snapshot shall be calculated using a whitelist strategy that assigns fixed voting weights independent of token holdings. The current governance token of the DAO is $SIGIL. This decouples governance voting from the economic token split.

§7.2 — Weight Table

Address / Entity	Role	Vote Weight
`copperlite.eth`	Core	1
`erajtob.eth`	Core	1
Fieldwork Holdings LLC (Secretariat address)	Secretariat	1
Fieldwork Holdings LLC (Treasury address)	Treasury	0

§7.3 — Quorum Configuration

Snapshot space quorum is set to 2 (minimum total vote weight required for a challenged proposal to be valid).

§7.4 — Symbol

The Snapshot space symbol shall be SIGIL, reflecting the current governance token.

Article VIII — Effective Date and Transition

§8.1 This proposal takes effect immediately upon settlement (optimistic or by vote).

§8.2 All existing pending proposals at the time of ratification are subject to the new quorum of 2.

§8.3 The Snapshot space configuration shall be updated within 48 hours of ratification to reflect the new strategy, quorum, and voting settings.

§8.4 The Gnosis Safe multisig shall be reconfigured within 48 hours of ratification per Article VI §6.5.

Voting

For: Approve SIG-005 in its entirety.
Against: Reject SIG-005.
Abstain with Objection: Register a formal challenge without voting for or against.

Submitted by Fieldwork Holdings LLC in its capacity as Treasury of Sigil Consulting DAO-LLC.